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1. Introduction 
Regression models typically postulate how the location parameter of a response variable Y changes 
with covariates 1,..., dX X . In the case of heteroscedastic models, the spread of Y is also modelled as a 
function of 1,..., dX X . In this paper we model the “concentration” of the distribution of Y as a function 
of the covariates. By concentration we mean spread relative to location. Besides the coefficient of 
variation, two famous concentration measures are the Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient. 
 In this section we first present the Lorenz curve and the closely related Bonferroni curve, 
which can be considered as devices for measuring inequality or concentration. We also propose two 
alternative curves of concentration and the corresponding summary measures of concentration that 
relate to statistical concepts of dispersion. We then present orderings that order distributions according 
to their degree of concentration. We propose and analyze regression versions in the rest of the paper. 
1.1. Defining concentration 
The Lorenz curve (LC) ( )L u  is defined (Lorenz (1905)) to be the proportion of the total amount of 
income that is owned by the “poorest” 100 × u percent of the population. More precisely, let the 
random income 0Y >  have the distribution function ( )F y , let { }1( ) inf : ( )F u y F y u− = ≥  denote the 
left inverse, and assume that 0 µ< < ∞ , where 
 1
0
( ) ( )F E Y F u duµ µ
∞
−= = = ∫ . 
Then the LC (see e.g. Gastwirth (1971)) is defined by 
 1 1
0
( ) ( ) ( ) , 0 1− −= = ≤ ≤∫uFL u L u F s ds uµ . 
When F is continuous we can write 
 { }1 1( ) ( )L u E YI Y F uµ− −⎡ ⎤= ≤⎣ ⎦  
where [ ]I A  denotes the indicator of the event A. 
 When the population consists of incomes of people, the LC measures deviation from the 
egalitarian case ( )L u u=  corresponding to where everyone has the same income 0a >  and the 
distribution of Y is point-mass at a. The other extreme occurs when one person has all the income. The 
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income of a person drawn at random is then zero with probability 1− , which corresponds to 
( ) 0, 0 1= ≤ <L u u . The intermediate case where Y is uniform on [ ]0, , 0b b > , corresponds to 
2( )L u u= . 
 In general ( )L u  will be non-decreasing, convex, below the line ( ) , 0 1L u u u= ≤ ≤ , and 
the greater the “distance” from u, the greater are the inequality in the population. If the population 
consists of companies providing a certain service or product, the LC measures to what extent a few 
companies dominate the market with the extreme case corresponding to monopoly. More generally, 
we can think of the LC as a measure of concentration of a nonnegative random variable Y. 
 A closely related curve is the Bonferroni curve (BC) ( )B u  which is defined (Aaberge 
(1982) and Giorgi and Mondani (1995)) as 
 1( ) ( ) ( ), 0 1FB u B u u L u u
−= = ≤ ≤ . 
When F is continuous the BC is the LC except truncation is replaced by conditioning 
 1 1( ) ( )B u E Y Y F uµ− −⎡ ⎤= ≤⎣ ⎦ . 
The BC possesses several attractive properties. First, it provides a convenient alternative interpretation 
of the information content of the Lorenz curve. For a fixed u, B(u) is the ratio between the mean 
income of the poorest 100u per cent of the population and the overall mean. Thus, the BC may also 
yield essential information on poverty provided that we know the poverty rate. Second, the BC of a 
uniform (0,a) distribution proves to be the diagonal line joining the points (0,0) and (1,1) and thus 
represents a useful reference line, in addition to the two well-known standard reference lines. The 
egalitarian reference line, coincides with the horizontal line joining the points (0,1) and (1,1). At the 
other extreme, when one person holds all income, the BC coincides with the horizontal axis except for 
u 1= . The uniform case yields ( )B u u= , which is exactly in the middle between the egalitarian and 
extreme non-egalitarian cases. 
 In the next subsection we will consider concepts of dispersion from the statistics 
literature. It turns out that those concepts lead to measures that are modifications of ( )L ⋅  and ( )B ⋅  and 
motivates the introduction of the following measures of concentration  
 
1
1 1
0
( )( )( ) ( ) , 0 1
( ) ( )
−
− −
⎡ ⎤= = = < <⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫
u
F
F F
L uF sC u C u ds u
F u F u
µ  
and 
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1
1 1
0
( )1 ( )( ) ( ) , 0 1
( ) ( )
−
− −
⎡ ⎤= = = < <⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫
u
F
F F
B uF sD u D u ds u
u F u F u
µ  
Accordingly, C(u) and D(u) emerge by replacing the overall meanµ  in the dominators of L(u) and 
B(u) by the uth quantile 1( )uy F u
−=  and C(u) (resp. D(u)) is equal to the ratio between the income 
share (resp. mean income) of those with lower income than the uth quantile and the u-quantile income. 
Thus, C(u) and ( )D u  measure how strongly the income below the uth quantile  is concentrated near yu. 
They satisfy 10,1)(,)( <<≤≤ uuDuuC , and C(u) equals u and 0 while ( )D u equals 1 and 0 in the 
egalitarian and extreme non-egalitarian cases, respectively, and they equal u/2 and 1 2  in the uniform 
case. 
 To summarize the information content of )(⋅C and )(⋅D  we introduce the following 
dispersion indices 
 [ ]1
0
2 ( )= −∫C u C u du  
 [ ]1
0
1 ( )= −∫D D u du . 
The dispersion indices C and D measure the distances from ( )C u  and ( )D u  to their values in the most 
concentrated cases, that is, the egalitarian case. Note that C and D can be considered as modified 
versions of the Gini and Bonferroni coefficients (see Aaberge (2000) for a normative justification of 
the Bonferroni coefficient as a measure of income inequality).  As the Gini and Bonferroni coefficients 
they take values between 0 and 1 and are increasing with increasing inequality. If all units have the 
same income then C D 0= = , and in the extreme non-egalitarian case where one unit has all the 
income and the others zero, 1= = = =G B C D . When F is uniform on [0, b], 1/ 2= = =B C D . ( )L u , 
( )B u , ( )C u , D(u), G, B, C and D are scale invariant, that is, they remain the same if Y is replaced by 
, 0aY a > . 
 G, B, C and D resemble “spread” divided by “location” scaled to go from zero to one as 
the distribution moves from the egalitarian to the extreme non-egalitarian case. These properties 
resemble that of the coefficient of variation, CV σ µ= , or its scaled version 
 
1* 3 1 3CV CV CV
−⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦  
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which goes from zero to one as we move from the egalitarian to the extreme non-egalitarian case and 
equals 1 2  in the uniform case. 
1.2. Ordering concentration 
When we are interested in how covariates influence concentration we may ask whether larger values 
of a covariate leads to more or less inequality. For instance, is there less inequality among the higher 
educated? To answer such questions we consider orderings that order distributions according to how 
concentrated they are. In statistics and reliability engineering, orderings are plentiful, e.g. Lehmann 
(1955), van Zwet (1964), Barlow and Proschan (1965), Birnbaum, Esary and Marshall (1966), 
Doksum (1969), Yanagimoto and Sibuya (1976), Bickel and Lehmann (1979), Rojo and He (1991), 
Rojo (1992) and Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994). In statistics, orderings are often discussed in terms 
of spread or dispersion. Thus, for non-negative random variables, using van Zwet (1964) we could 
define Y to have a distribution which is more spread than that of Y0 if Y can be written as ( )0Y h Y=  
for some non-negative, nondecreasing convex function h. It turns out to be more general and more 
convenient to replace “convex” with “starshaped” (convex functions are starshaped and concave 
functions are anti-starshaped): 
 Weakening the convexity condition 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 0 11 1 , 0 1g x x g x g xλ λ λ λ λ+ − ≤ + − ≤ ≤ , 
we call a function g defined on the interval [ )0,I ⊂ ∞  starshaped on I if ( ) ( )≤g x g xλ λ  whenever 
,x I x Iλ∈ ∈  and 0 1λ≤ ≤ . Thus if ( )0,I = ∞ , then the graph of g initially lies on or below any 
straight line through the origin, and then lies on or above it. If ( ) ( )g x g xλ λ≥ , g is anti-starshaped. 
On the class F  of continuous distributions F with (0) 0F = , the (Doksum (1969)) following ordering 
(partial) is defined: *F H<  (F is starshaped with respect to H) if 1H F−  is starshaped on 
{ }: 0 ( ) 1x F x< < , where { }1( ) inf : ( )H u x H x u− = ≥ . Thus if *F H<  and X has distribution F, then 
[ ]1 ( )Z H F X−=  has distribution H and is a starshaped transformation of X; hence we say that the 
distribution of Z is more dispersed than the distribution of X. This interpretation is valid when 
{ } ( ): 0 ( ) 1 0,x F x< < = ∞ , because when *F H< , there exists a nondecreasing function ( )g x  such 
that Z has the same distribution as ( )g X X . To see this take ( )1( ) ( )g x H F x−=  and see the proof of 
Proposition 1.1. 
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 When *F H<  we also call the distribution of X more concentrated than that of Z. That is, 
if X and Z are random variables that represent incomes under two different conditions, the condition 
generating X corresponds to less inequality. 
 We next show that the preceding definition of concentration leads to the corresponding 
ordering of the concentration curves ( )FC ⋅  and DF(.)  as well as of the dispersion indices C and D. 
 
Proposition 1.1. Suppose F, H ∈ F  and *F H< , then ( ) ( )≥F HC u C u and  
( ) ( ) ,0 1≥ < <F HD u D u u . Moreover, F HC C≥ and ≥F HD D . 
 
Proof. Note that the condition ( ) ( )g x g xλ λ≤  is equivalent to ( ) ( )g x x g x xλ λ⎡ ⎤ ≤⎣ ⎦ , that is ( )g x x  
is non-decreasing. It follows that by setting ( )u F x= , ( ), ,′ ′= <v F x x x  we obtain  
 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )− − − −≤H u F u H v F v  for 0 1u v< < < .  
That is  
 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) for 0 1H u H v F u F v u v− − − −≤ < < < . 
If we integrate this inequality over ( )0,u v∈ , we obtain ( ) ( ), 0 1F HC v C v v≥ < < . The other 
inequalities follow from this. 
     
2. Regression 
Next consider the case where the distribution of Y depends on covariates such as education, work 
experience, status of parents, sex, etc. Let ( )1,..., TdX X=X  denote the covariates, let F(y )x denote 
the conditional distribution of Y given =X x  and define ( ) ( ){ }1 inf :F u y F y u− = ≥x x . 
 We define the conditional C- and D- curves as 
 ( ) ( )( )
-1
-1
0
0 1
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫
u F s
C u = ds, < u <
F u
x
x
x
 
and 
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 .
C(u )
D( u )= , 0 < u < 1
u
x
x  
We define the corresponding conditional dispersion indices as  
 ( )( )1
0
( ) 2= −∫C u C u dux x  
and 
 ( )( )1
0
( ) 1= −∫D D u dux x . 
3. Parametric Regression Models 
3.1. Transformation regression models 
Let Y0 denote a baseline variable which corresponds to the case where the covariate vector x has no 
effect on the distribution of income. We assume that ( )F y x  depends on x through some real valued 
function ( )( ) ,g∆ =x x β  which is known up to a vector β of unknown parameters. Let ZY ~  denote 
“Y is distributed as Z”. As we have seen in Section 1.2, if large values of ( )∆ x  corresponds to a more 
egalitarian distribution of income, then it is reasonable to model this as 
 )(~ 0YhY , 
for some increasing concave function h depending on ( )∆ x  because an increasing concave 
transformation brings values closer together relative to their mean. On the other hand, an increasing 
convex h would correspond to income being less concentrated. 
 Set ( )11, ,..., Tdx x=x  and ( )0 ,..., Tdβ β=β , then a convenient parametric form of h is 
(3.1) ∆0~ YY . 
Here 0 1< ∆ <  corresponds to covariates that lead to a more egalitarian distribution of income while 
1∆ >  is the opposite case. Note that 
(3.2) 0log~log YY ∆ . 
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Thus (3.1) is a scale model in logZ Y=  and ∆ is a scale parameter for log income. 
 
Example 3.1. Suppose 00 ~ FY  where F0 is the Pareto standardized distribution 
 0
1( ) 1 , 1, 1
a
F y a y
y
⎛ ⎞= − > ≥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
Note that here wage has been standardized by dividing by the minimum wage, that is, one is the 
smallest possible value of Y. Then 0Y Y
∆=  has the Pareto distribution 
 ( ) ( )10 11 , 1F y F y yy
α
∆⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= = − ≥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
x
x , 
where ( ) ( ) / aα = ∆x x . Provided ( ) 1α >x and F0 is the baseline distribution of Y, the corresponding 
conditional regression C-curve and C-coefficient is easily found to be given by 
 ( )
1
( )
1 ( )C(u ) (1 u) (1 u)
αα
−α
⎡ ⎤= − − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
xx
xx , 0<u<1, 
and 
 1C( )
( ) 1
= α +x x . 
By choosing the parametrization ( ) (exp( ) 1)= − −Tα βx x  we have ( )( ) exp= TC x x β , where β may be 
estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 
Example 3.2. Another interesting case is obtained by setting F0 equal to the log normal distribution 
[ ]( )0 0log( ) , 0Φ − >y yµ σ . In this case we also get an explicit form of the conditional concentration 
curve: 
 
Proposition 3.1. In the model (3.2) with F0 log normal 
(3.3) ( ) [ ]( )1 1 2 2 10 0 0 01( ) ( ) exp / ( ( ) / (2− − −⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤= Φ Φ − ∆ ∆ − Φ ∆⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭C u u uσ σ σ σx x x) x) . 
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Proof. Because 0µ  is a scale parameter for Y, it will cancel in the concentration curve. Thus we can set 
0 0µ = . In the proof we write σ  for 0σ . Here ( ) 11 10 ( )F u F u− − ∆⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦x , where ( )∆ = ∆ x , thus 
 
( )
( )
[ ]( )
1
0
1 1
0
21
( ) 11
1 1
0 0
0 0 0
log ( ) ( )
1
0
1( )
1 1 1 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ,
−
− −
−
− − ∆∆
Φ
−∆ ∆
−∞ −∞
Φ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟− − − ∆⎝ ⎠∆
−∞
⎡ ⎤= =⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= = Φ Φ − ∆
∫ ∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫
F uu u
F u uz z
z
u v
F s ds F s ds y dF y
ze dF e e dz
e v dv u e
σ
σσ
σ ϕ σ
σ ϕ σ σ
x
 
where the last equality follows from 
 
2 2
2 1 11
2 22
vv v
e e e e
σ σσ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− −− ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∆ ∆⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∆ = ⋅ . 
The result follows because  
 { }1 10( ) exp ( ) / (− −= Φ ∆F u uσx x) . 
 
 Suppose we choose the parametrization ( )( ) exp T∆ =x x β . To estimate β for this 
lognormal model we set logi iZ Y= . Then Zi has a ( ) ( )( )2 20 0,i iN µ σ∆ ∆x x  distribution, where 
( )11, ,..., Ti i idx x=x . Here only 2d +  of the 3d +  parameters are identifiable because in 
 00 0
1
( ) exp
d
j j
j
e xβµ µ β
=
⎧ ⎫∆ = ⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑x , 
0µ  and 0β  are not both identifiable. Thus we absorb 0µ  into 0eβ  and replace ( )0 iµ ∆ x  by ( )i∆ x . 
When 1,..., nY Y  are independent, this gives the log likelihood function (leaving out the constant term) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }22 20 0
1
1, log 2 exp
2
n
T T T
i i i i
i
l n Zσ σ σ −
=
= − − − Σ − −∑ x x xβ β β β . 
See Anscombe (1961), Bickel (1978), and Carroll and Ruppert (1982, 1988) for estimation based on 
such likelihoods. Bickel suggests modifications that result in more robust estimates. 
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3.2. Models based on the income improvement rate. The Weibull model 
Poverty in undeveloped regions of the world is in part measured be the incomes earned by the people 
in these regions, and the success of aid and programs to decrease poverty is also measured by income. 
It would be helpful to have a measure of the odds of income improvement of a person whose income 
is Y. Suppose this person goes looking for a new job without acquiring any new skills and without 
there being new types of job opportunities being developed in the region. Let Y ′  denote the new 
income, where Y and Y ′  have the same distribution and are independent. Then in the discrete case we 
define the income improvement rate as the odds of improving on the wage Y y= , that is, 
(3.4) 
( )
( )
1 ( )
( )
P Y Y Y y F y
P Y y f y
′ > = −== . 
Note that we assume ( ) 0P Y Y′ < = , that is, the person would refuse a lesser paying job. We extend 
(3.4) in the natural way to the continuous case and write the IIR as 
 1 ( )( )
( )
F yr y
f y
−≡  
for { }: ( ) 0y y f y∈ > . 
 For the Pareto distribution ( ) 1 , 1, 1−= − > ≥aF y y a y , the IIR is 1( ) , 1Pr y a y y−≡ ≥ . 
Thus the odds on improving ones income is proportional to the current income. As seen in Example 
3.1, the Pareto power regression model where 0log ( ) logY Y= ∆ x  with Y0 Pareto has 
( ) 1 ( ) , 1Pr y x a y y−= ∆ ≥x . 
 For the exponential distribution { }( ) 1 expF y yλ= − − , we have a constant IIR 
1( )Er y λ−≡ . However, most empirical wage distributions have heavier right tails than the exponential 
distribution. The Weibull distribution { }( ) 1 exp , 0, 0aF y y a yλ= − − > ≥ , is a more flexible choice. In 
this case 1 1 1( ) aWr y a yλ− − −= , and for the Weibull power regression model where 0log ( ) logY Y= ∆ x  
with Y0 Weibull, we have 
 ( ) ( )1 1 ( )1 1 ( ) , 0Wr y a y yλ − ∆− −= ∆ >xx x . 
In this case the IIR is increasing or decreasing in y according as ( )( ) a∆ x  is greater than or smaller 
than 1. Note that ( )1Wr y + x  approximates ( )Pr y x  for ( )a ∆ x  close to 0. 
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 If we choose the parametrization { }( ) exp T∆ =x x β , then the parameters of the Weibull 
model can be estimated by maximum likelihood software which also provides standard errors. 
4. Lehmann-Cox type models. Partial likelihood 
4.1. The distribution transformation model 
Let 00 ~ FY  be a baseline income distribution and let Y ~ F(y )x  denote the distribution of income 
for given covariate vector x. One way to express that ( )F y x  is less concentrated than 0 ( )F y  is to use 
the model 
 ( ) ( )0 ( )F y h F y=x  
for a convex transformation h depending on x. This interpretation is valid when 
{ } ( )0: 0 ( ) 1 0,< < = ∞y F y , because the density of ( )F y x  is ( )0 0( ) ( )h F y f y′  where ( )0 ( )h F y′  is 
increasing. Note the similarity with Section 1.1 where multiplying X with an increasing function 
defined less concentration. Similarly, g concave corresponds to more egalitarian income. A model of 
the form ( )2 1( ) ( )F y g F y=  was considered for the two-sample case by Lehmann (1953) who noted 
that 2 1( ) ( ), 0F y F y
∆= ∆ > , was a convenient choice of h. Similarly, for regression experiments, we 
consider a regression version of this model which we define as 
(4.1) ( ) 0 ( )F y F y∆=x , 
where ( )( ) ,g∆ = ∆ =x x β  with  a real valued parametric function and where 1∆ >  or 1∆ <  
corresponds to more or less egalitarian respectively. Since 
 ( ) 0log log ( )F y F y= ∆x  
this model assumes that the log of the income distributions of Y and Y0 are proportional with ∆ being 
the proportionality constant. 
 If we set ( )01i iZ F Y= − , then Z has the distribution 
 ( )( ) 1 1 , 0 1H u u u∆= − − < < . 
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Since the rank Ri of Yi equals 1 in S+ − , where Si is the rank of ( )01 iF Y− , we can use rank methods, or 
partial likelihood methods, to estimate β without knowing F0. In fact, because the Cox partial 
likelihood is a rank likelihood we can apply the likelihood in the next subsection to estimate the 
parameters in the current model provided we reverse the ordering of the Y’s. 
4.2. The income function transformation model 
In this section we show how the Pareto parametric regression model for income can be extended to a 
semiparametric model where the shape of the income distribution is completely general. Let the 
incomes 1,..., nY Y  be independent and let ( )iF y ∆  be the distribution of Yi, where 
 { }exp Ti i∆ = x β . 
One convenient model is a regression version of the Pareto model which we define as 
 ( ) 1 , ; 0ii icF y y cy
∆⎛ ⎞= − ≥ ∆ >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
x , 
where c, the minimum salary in the population, is known. This model satisfies 
(4.2) ( ) [ ]01 1 ( ) iiF y F y ∆− = −x , 
where 0 ( ) 1 ,
cF t y c
y
= − ≥ . When F0 is an arbitrary continuous distribution on [ )0,∞ , the model (4.2) 
for the two sample case was called the Lehmann alternative by Savage (1956, 1980) because if V 
satisfies model (4.1), then Y V= −  satisfies model (4.2). Cox (1972) introduced proportional hazard 
models for regression experiments in survival analysis which also satisfy (4.2) and introduced partial 
likelihood methods that can be used to analyse such models even in the presence of time dependent 
covariates (in our case, wage dependent covariates). 
 Cox introduced the model equivalent to (4.2) as a generalization of the exponential model 
where { }0 ( ) 1 expF y y= − −  and ( ) ( )0i iF y F y= ∆x . That is, (4.2) is in the Cox case a generalization 
of a scale model with scale parameter i∆ . However, in our case we regard (4.2) as a shape model 
which generalizes the Pareto model, and i∆  represents the degree of concentration of the variable Y 
for a given covariate vector xi. 
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 If we call the probability ( )( ) 1 ( )F y P Y y F y= > = −  of income greater than y the income 
function, then (4.2) is a model with proportional log income functions. Note that 1i∆ <  corresponds to 
( )F y x  more concentrated than 0 ( )F y  while 1i∆ >  corresponds to F0 less concentrated. 
 The Cox (1972) partial likelihood to estimate β for (4.2) is (see also Kalbfleisch and 
Prentice (2002), page 102), 
 
( )
( )
( )( )
( )
1 ( )
exp
( )
exp
i
Tn
i
T
i k
k Y
L
=
∈
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∏ ∑
R
x
x
ββ β , 
where ( )iY  is the i-th order statistic, ( )ix  is the covariate vector for the subject with response ( )iY , and 
( ) { }( ) ( ) ( ):i k iY k Y Y= ≥R . Here ˆ arg max ( )L=β β  can be found in many statistical packages. These 
packages also give the standard errors of the ˆ jβ . Note that ( )L β  does not involve F0. 
 Many estimates are available for F0 in model (4.2), again in packages. If we maximize the 
likelihood keeping ˆ=β β  fixed, we find (e.g., Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002), page 116) 
( )0 ( )
1
ˆ ˆ1
i
i j
j
F Y α
=
= −∏  where 
 
( )
( )( )( )
( )
( )
ˆexp
ˆ 1
ˆexp
i
T
i
j T
k
k Y
α
∈
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
R
x
x
β
β . 
 We can now give empirical expressions for the conditional C-curve and the coefficient C. 
Using (4.2), we find 
(4.3) ( ) ( ) 11 10 1 1 iiF u F u− − ∆⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠x , 
(4.4) ( ) ( ) 11 10
0 0
( ) 1 1− − ∆⎛ ⎞= = − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ i
u u
i iu F t dt F v dvµ x x . 
We set ( ) 110 1 1 it F v− ∆⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  and obtain 
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 ( ) [ ]( ) 10 0
0
1 ( ) ( )
i
i
u
i iu t F t dF t
δ
µ ∆ −= ∆ −∫x  
where ( ) 110( ) 1 1 ii u F uδ − ∆⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . Note that when all 0, 1j jβ = ≥ , then 1i∆ =  and ( )C u x and 
( )D u x reduce to the C- and D- curves without covariates. To estimate the C- and D-curves, we let 
 ( ) ( )( ) [ ]1 10 ( ) 0 1
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
i i
i i j i ji
j j
b F Y F Y α α α− −−
= =
= − = = −∏ ∏  
be the jumps of 0ˆ ( )F ⋅ ; then 
 ( ) ( ) 1ˆ( ) 0 ( )ˆ ˆˆ 1 ii i j j j ju b Y F Yµ −∆⎡ ⎤= ∆ Σ −⎣ ⎦x , 
where the sum is over j with ( ) ( ) 1ˆ0 ( )ˆ 1 1 ∆≤ − − ijF Y u . Finally, ( ) ( ) ( )1ˆ ˆˆC u u F uµ −=x x x  and 
ˆDˆ(u ) C(u ) / u=x x  where ( )1Fˆ u− x  is the estimate of the conditional quantile function obtained 
from (4.3) by replacing ∆i  with ∆ˆi .  
Remark. We can obtain nonparametric estimates of ( )C u x and ( )D u x  by using nonparametric 
estimates of ( )1−F u x  in (4.3) and (4.4). These could then be compared with the estimates based on 
the semiparametric model (4.2). See Chaudhuri (1991) and Dabrowska (1992) for nonparametrically 
estimated  ( )1−F u x . 
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